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This paper argues that econometric analysis of housing price indexes before 2006 generated forecasts
of future long-term price growth and low estimated probabilities of extreme price decreases. These
forecasts of future increases in home-loan collateral values may have affected both the demand and
the supply of mortgages. Standard time series models using repeat-sales indices suggested that positive
trends had a long half-life. Expectations based on such models supported expectations that could lead
to an asset bubble. 
Analysis of data from the HMDA loan data base and LoanPerformance.com at the MSA level and
at the loan level substantiates both supply and demand effects of past price trends in housing markets,
particularly with respect to subprime mortgage applications and approvals. At the MSA level, past
home price increases are associated with higher subprime applications and loan to value ratios. Approval
probability of subprime loans was not affected by higher loan to value ratios. At the loan level, the
approval probability of subprime applications is also positively associated with past home price
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I. Introduction 
The  recent  subprime  mortgage  crisis  in  the  United  States  was  preceded  by  a  sharp 
increase in housing prices in the early 2000s.  Economists at the time interpreted this 
increase variously as a classic housing bubble, the results of home-owner money illusion, 
or evidence of binding supply constraints in key housing markets.
2  Regardless of which 
view is correct, one potentially important implication of the housing price run -up before 
2006 is the effect it had on mortgage lending.   
A key feature of house price indexes until 2006 is the degree to which they could be 
forecasted  by  past  trends.  In  this  paper,  we  examine  the  effect  of  this  apparent 
predictability on perceptions about future house prices on the demand and supply of 
mortgages. While back-tests of forecasting models might have alerted market participants 
to the potential for model failure, empirical analysis of widely -quoted data sources like 
the Case-Shiller indexes and the OFHEO indexes clearly predicted continued growth. 
Risk models based on such forecasts suggested that housing would be good collateral for 
loans over multiple-year horizons. 
On the demand side ,  extrapolation of  past trends  can    influence both the level  of  
household investment in housing and the risk characteristics of the applicant pool.  First, 
expectations of positive future home price growth based on past trends renders housing a 
more attractive asset, suggesting that a household will increase allocation to housing over 
the near term.
3  Applicants borrow to finance this allocation, which makes them riskier 
from  a  lender’s  perspective.    Second,  because  the  after-tax  financial  benefits  of 
mortgaged home ownership are increasing in income,
4 higher forecast returns may also 
bring more low-income loan applicants into the market.   In  this  paper we look for 
evidence of increases in demand,  applicant risk, and participation conditional on past 
trends. 
On the supply side, mortgage lenders may interpret greater past price increases as 
evidence of lower default risk because the loan to value ratio is expected to fall with 
future house price increases.
5  Consequently, lenders may  accommodate the increased 
demand for mortgages because the expected future recovery from foreclosure is expected 
to exceed the outstanding mortgage principal.  The supply of mortgage loans thus 
increases  for  all  types  of  mortgage s,  but  the  effect  may  be  most  pronounced  for 
borrowers with poor credit quality because of the participation effect.  
To explore these hypotheses, we analyze 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
mortgage data, historical Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) home 
price  indexes  for  American  metropolitan  statistic  areas  (MSAs),  and   2006 
                                                        
2 cf. Case and Shiller (2003), Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) and Glaeser, Gyourko and 
Saks (2005). 
3 For example, in a standard mortgage default decision model, changes in home prices are 
an important explanatory variable.  Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) provide a 
survey of the literature on these models. 
4 C.f. Goetzmann and Spiegel (2004) 
5 c.f. Doms, Mark, Furlong, Fred and Krainer, John (2007) Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340577
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LoanPerformance.com data on average loan to value ratios.  We conduct MSA level and 
loan level analyses.   
We  first  document  the  implication  for  forecasting  based  on  reliance  on  standard 
econometric  models  using  housing  price  data.    Because  of  the  strong  autoregressive 
component in housing indices at the national and at the MSA level over the past 25 years 
most quantitative models using data up to 2006 forecast low probabilities for a crash in 
the near term.  Ex post, these models were completely wrong. Ex ante, however, there 
was no consensus of model failure, even among professional economists.  Our study first 
documents the (mis) performance of standard time-series models, and them explores the 
degree to which such mistaken forecasts may have affected demand and supply of capital.  
We  examine  demand  for  mortgages  using  the  HMDA  mortgage  application  data 
aggregated at the MSA level.  The variation in past home price growth across MSAs 
allows us to observe the relationship between home prices and demand for mortgages.  
Consistent  with  our  demand  story,  2006  mortgage  applications  for  both  prime  and 
subprime mortgages are significantly and positively correlated with home price increases 
between 2000 and 2005.  These results are robust to controls for demographic factors 
such as population and per capita income.   In addition, we find evidence of  increased 
household allocation to housing in MSAs with greater past home price appreciation.  For 
example, the loan size to applicant income ratio is positively correlated with past home 
price appreciation.  One possible story for the increase in leverage is that homeowners 
believed they could sell their home for more than the mortgage principal should they not 
be able to meet the payments.   
This result is robust to controls for income per capita and the ratio of median home prices 
to median household incomes.  We also find that the loan to value ratio for both prime 
and  subprime  applications  is  negatively  correlated  with  past  house  price  increases, 
suggesting that borrowers invested more of their own personal wealth in home equity.  
Further,  we  find  that  the  home  value  to  income  ratio  for  both  prime  and  subprime 
applications  is  positively  correlated  with  past  home  price  increases,  showing  that 
borrowers sought to purchase more expensive houses holding constant their incomes.  
Overall,  the  results  indicate  that  in  MSAs  with  greater  past  home  price  growth  the 
demand  for  prime  and  subprime  mortgages  was  higher  and  the  applicant  pool  was 
riskier.  
To analyze the effect of past home prices on mortgage supply, we turn to the HMDA 
mortgage approvals data.  We note that the approvals are conditional on the quality and 
quantity of the applications across MSAs.
6  In addition, competition among lenders will 
also affect approvals in the cross section.  Cross -sectional regressions show that prime 
mortgage approvals are decreasing in past home price growth while subprime mortgage 
approvals are unchanged.  This suggests that subprime lenders accommodated the extra 
demand in MSAs with higher past home price growth while prime lenders did not.  Given 
                                                        
6 For example, a positive shift in demand may bring less creditworthy investors to the 
mortgage market, which would result in a lower rate of mortgage approval if 
underwriting standards do not change.  However supply effects might cause a loosening 
of credit standards, leaving total number of approvals unchanged.   3 
that applicant leverage was increasing in past home prices, prime lenders may not have 
accommodated the extra demand because it corresponded to applicants with higher loan 
to income ratios who were perceived as more risky.  Subprime lenders, on the other hand, 
did  accommodate  the  demand  suggesting  that  they  believed  that  future  home  price 
increases would compensate for the increased leverage of the borrowers. 
When we compare the effect of leverage on prime and subprime approvals, we find that 
in MSAs with higher past price appreciation, prime lenders approve applications with 
lower loan to income ratios and subprime lenders approve applications with higher loan 
to income ratios.  We also test the effect of past price changes on the loan to value ratios 
of approved prime and subprime mortgages.  The coefficient on past price increases is 
negative  and  significant  for  both  prime  and  subprime  approvals,  with  and  without 
controlling for loan to value ratios of applications.  Since loans with lower loan to value 
ratios are less risky holding constant other factors, this result provides no evidence for 
looser underwriting standards used by either prime or subprime lenders.  We also have 
robust  results  showing  that  the  home  value  to  income  ratio  of  subprime  and  prime 
approvals is increasing in greater past price growth.  This indicates that both prime and 
subprime lenders allowed borrowers to buy more expensive homes in MSAs with great 
past price increases.   
Loan level probit analysis provides more direct evidence of  supply effects.  Past price 
appreciation  significantly  reduces  the  approvals  of  prime  mortgages  but  significantly 
increases the approvals of subprime mortgages. The results are robust to controls such as 
loan to income ratios.  The negative relation between past home price growth and prime 
approvals might be capturing the higher leverage and risk of prime applications in MSAs 
with greater past price rises.  The positive relation between past home price growth and 
subprime approvals suggests that subprime lenders were more likely to accommodate 
increased demand in MSAs with greater past price growth despite the higher level of 
leverage in the applications.   
Overall,  our  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  both  subprime  borrowers  and  lenders 
considered  past  housing  returns  as  a  factor  in  the  home  purchase  process  and  the 
underwriting process – perhaps extrapolating the recent past as a forecast of future home 
values.  In  contrast,  while  prime  borrowers  considered  past  housing  returns  in  their 
housing demand as well, prime lenders did not accommodate the demand and instead 
approved a smaller fraction of prime loans in MSAs with higher past housing returns and 
thus applications with higher leverage ratios. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section II reviews the related literature.  
Section III discusses the predictability of home price indexes.  Section IV examines the 
implication of using time-series  models  and  housing indexes for evaluation of future 
collateral values; particular attention is paid to forecasts of housing price trends using 
data available immediately prior to the subprime crisis, and it considers whether model 
failure could have been reasonably anticipated.  Section V examines the extent to which 
subprime  mortgage  applications  and  approvals  were  influenced  by  past  price  trends. 
Section VI considers alternative explanations.  Section VII provides a discussion of the 
results and concludes.   4 
 
II. Related Research 
Much of the recent research about the subprime crisis has focused on the process of 
origination and securitization in order to understand the roots of the disaster.  Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert (2007) for example, show that the credit quality of securitized loans 
declined  over  the  period  2001-2006.    They  find  that  home  price  declines  after  2006 
explain borrower delinquency and argue that price increases in the early 2000’s masked 
the potential magnitude of the crisis.
 7  Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2008) show that from 1997-
2006,  lending  rates  increasingly  relied  on  hard  information  and  propose  that  future 
default rates were underestimated because of the lack of soft information.  Mian and Sufi 
(2008)  use  a  zip-code  level  data  to  test  whether  or  not  the  credit  expansion  at  the 
subprime level was due to credit supply or credit demand.  Measuring unfulfilled demand 
as previously rejected mortgage applications, they find that lending standards loosened 
from 2001 to 2005 where previous unmet demand was high.  They conclude that the 
increased issuance of subprime mortgages was due to an increase in the supply of credit 
as opposed to an increase in demand for credit.  They conjecture that the growth in 
housing price indexes in markets with high subprime issuance was a result of greater 
credit access. 
Other researchers have focused on the role that the emergence of a secondary market 
played  in  supplying  the  credit.    Gabriel  and  Rosenthal  (2006)  find  evidence  that 
securitization of subprime mortgage loans greatly increased access to credit among low-
income homeowners – consistent with stated government social policy.
8  Keyes et. al. 
(2008) look at the risks created by the securitization  by exploring the exposure of the 
secondary  mortgage  market  to  moral  hazard  in  loan  origination.    They  find  that 
securitized loans were more likely to default following the crisis, consistent with a story 
of lower underwriting standards.  
The relative contribution of the current paper is to focus on the role past ho me price 
appreciation played in both the demand and the supply of prime and subprime mortgages.  
It is limited to the extent that we develop neither a formal tenure choice model nor a 
formal mortgage default model.  We focus instead on a specific input to such models.  
We  argue  that  price  index  appreciation  and  apparent  long -term  predictability  were 
potentially important factors in the decision processes of many market participants, and 
we test some empirical implications of this argument.  In particular, we focus on the 
demand side and suggest a story where individuals ma de a rational investment decision 
when applying for a prime or subprime mortgage.  The inclusion of prime mortgages in 
our analysis also provides a benchmark for interpreting the subprime mortgage results.       
                                                        
7 Their findings are consistent with the considerable evidence that home prices are 
important co-determinants of default. See, for example Downing, Wallace and Stanton 
(2005) and Crews Cutts and Van Order (2005). 
8  The policy implications of the subprime mortgage market are further explored in 
Wachter, Russo and Hershaff (2005) and Calem, Gillen and Wachter (2003).   5 
Our assertion is that expectations of future appreciation, based upon extrapolation of past 
trends, may be a factor in the decision functions of both home buyers and mortgage 
lenders,  and  help  explain  several  of  the  recently-documented  empirical  findings, 
including the deterioration of credit standards and the increase in the supply of credit to 
previously constrained markets. While individual homeowner exuberance or irrationality 
may have played a role in stimulating the demand for housing and mortgage credit in the 
2000s, marginal home buyers may rationally decide to become home owners or existing 
home buyers may increase mortgage leverage when the expected future appreciation is 
high.    Moreover,  while  moral  hazard  has  been  advanced  as  one  explanation  for  the 
deterioration of credit standards, evidence that credit standards seemed looser in MSAs 
with greater past price rises suggests that the decision functions of lenders and originators 
are affected also by the expectation of future house price appreciation. 
 
III. Predictability of House Price Indexes 
Most  current  measures  of  home  price  appreciation  are  based  upon  the  repeat-sales 
regression  [RSR].
9  The RSR relies upon repeated sales of individual properties to 
estimate a time-series of past rates of capital appreciation.  The well-known Case-Shiller 
indexes are based upon the RSR, as are the OFHEO indexes used to monitor the capital 
adequacy of the housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.    
Case and Shiller (1989) found that RSR housing indexes  follow an autoregressive 
process, rendering them highly predictable.  In part, this predictability is an artifact of the 
estimation  procedure  that  by  necessity  has  difficulty  in  identifying  closely -timed 
shocks.
10  However, the inertia in housing indexes is   also due to actual economic 
phenomena.   Housing is not as efficient, nor as liquid as the stock market.  News is not 
rapidly  impounded  in  prices  but  instead  manifests  itself  slowly.    Unlike  securities 
markets, housing markets have fewer pure speculators, housing is difficult to sell short, 
time on the market matters, and there are important factors of individual preferences and 
beliefs.   People are reticent to sell their homes for many reasons other than price. Besides 
inducing inertia in housing indexes, these factors may also distort inferences regarding 
the value of a home in the market as collateral.
11  Case and Shiller (2003) argue that the 
inertia in housing prices provides a natural condition for the development of a bubble 
because of the potential for overly optimistic beliefs about future price increases to form. 
One problem with relying on housing indexes as evidence of market values is that they 
are conditioned upon market liquidity.   Crashes only appear to develop slowly in house 
price indexes because transactions decrease as buyers are unwilling to recognize a loss.
12  
Thus, an econometric forecast that ignores the potential for illiquidity can be misleading.  
Such liquidity-adjusted price indexes were not widely available for a broad spectrum o f 
                                                        
9 Cf. Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963). 
10 cf. Geltner (1997). 
11 Cf. Lin and Vandell (2007), Goetzmann (1993). 
12  Goetzmann and Peng (2005), Clayton, Miller and Peng (2008)   6 
housing markets before 2006. In other words, market participants may have been making 
unconditional forecasts based on conditional data. 
 
IV. Time Series Forecasts 
IV.1 Data 
Monthly Case-Shiller indexes for twenty of the major metropolitan areas in the United 
States are available for download at the S&P website.
13  Quarterly indexes for all MSAs 
in the United States, and for each state, are available from the OFHEO website.
14   The 
major difference between these two sources is the underlying data.  The OFH EO data is 
constructed from transactions or appraisals associated with mortgages purchased or 
insured  by  Fannie  Mae  or  Freddie  Mac  since  1975.      These  mortgages  are 
overwhelmingly “prime” loans, and thus by definition not subprime.  The data used to 
construct the Case-Shiller indexes are not restricted to transactions associated with prime 
mortgages, nor do they rely on appraised values. 
IV.2  Trends 
Figure 1 plots the Case-Shiller indexes with a common value in December 1999.  The 
figure suggests that the price appreciation in housing after 2000 on average was higher 
than before 2000 – at least up until the recent crash. 
More distinctive is the inertia in the series. This may be partly due to the fact that Case 
and Shiller use a three-month moving average, but adjusting for this, the momentum in 
the indexes still seems powerful.  Ignoring high-level econometrics for a moment, cover 
up  the  graph  from  2006  on  and  ask  yourself  whether  you  would  have  predicted  a 
significant price correction in the next two years.  There was little historical precedent for 
a major correction.  One could only point to the price slump in some markets after 1990 
as a precedent and a few other regionally limited events. 
Figure 2 provides additional insight into the earlier price dynamics.  It is constructed by 
identifying all the OFHEO MSA indexes for which continuous data are available between 
1980 and 2005.  Since there are more than 380 MSAs in the OFHEO data set, a plot like 
Figure 1 is not meaningful.  The K-means clustering algorithm is applied
15 to aggregate 
the data. The algorithm groups indexes by minimizing within group sums of squared 
deviations from the group mean index.  An arbitrary choice of five group centers allows 
sufficient range of performance.  At least three distinct trends can be seen.  One set of 
cities, mostly in Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana, peak about 1986 and then drop by a 
factor 10% to 20%.  Another group, comprising mostly of California cities and Boston 
peak around 1990 and dropped by a similar magnitude over the next five years.  A group 
comprising mostly of Florida cities had a dramatic run-up in the 1980s, then flattened out 




15 Which intersect, by construction, in 1995.   7 
after  1990.  Two  groups  of  mostly  “Heartland”  cities  showed  relatively  consistent 
performance over the period.  Thus, twenty-five years of housing data demonstrates some 
macro-economic dynamics, although slumps on portfolios of cities were on the order of 
10% to 20% nominal depreciation over horizons of five years.   
This is not to say that cross-sectionally, individual cities did not experience extended 
periods of real price depreciation.  Other studies of these data show that homeowners in 
specific cities have historically faced significant housing price risk.
16 Nevertheless, it 
would have been easy to believe that the trends in these figures provided some  basis for 
estimating the timing and magnitude of future price declines  –  particularly  since  the 
OFHEO  figures  were  produced  by  a  government  agency  for  the  specific  purpose  of 
evaluating precisely such risk. 
IV.3 Risk and Return 
Figure 3 plots the annualized arithmetic mean return and standard deviation of the Case-
Shiller indexes for which data are available from 1987 through 2005.  Over this time 
period, the arithmetic annual growth in the CPI index was 3.7%, so nearly all of the 
MSAs experience real price appreciation in the time period.  The Case-Shiller composite 
index of the ten cities experienced a 6.7% return and a 2.25% standard deviation.  The 
standard deviation is obviously a misleading indicator of long-term risk because of the 
documented inertia in the time-series. 
Figure 4 is a similar plot for the OFHEO indexes, with the MSA corresponding to the 
Case-Shiller indexes labeled.  For the most part, the Case-Shiller cities had higher returns 
compared to the typical city in the OFHEO sample. The relative volatility of Miami and 
Las Vegas are noteworthy.  
IV.4 Time-Series Dependency 
Figure 5 plots the monthly housing returns for the Case-Shiller Los Angeles series (from 
1987) against its lagged values for horizons up to 25 months.   The plots for the other 
cities are not reported, but the Los Angeles return series inter-temporal dependency is 
fairly representative of that of other Case-Shiller indexes. The correlation is reported in 
the upper left corner of the plot. Even at a two-year horizon, the correlation is positive, 
suggesting that current trends are sustained over multiple year horizons.  Figure 6 plots 
the quarterly housing returns for the OFHEO Los Angeles series (from 1980).  The lag 
correlation now extends out to 24 quarters – more than six years.   Correlations after the 
first three years are negative, suggesting mean reversion in the LA housing market at 
long horizons. 
Taken together, the monthly and the quarterly correlations of lagged returns suggest that 
a time series’ forecast based on an ARIMA model is potentially useful.   
IV.5 Forecasting Methodology 
                                                        
16 Caplin, Chan, Freeman and Tracy (1999), Goetzmann and Spiegel (2002).   8 
Undoubtedly some mortgage market participants used state-of-the-art forecasting tools to 
predict defaults and to assess future collateral risk.  By 2006, not only was the inertia of 
housing indexes well known, but the link between house price values and defaults had 
been well studied
17.  Thus, predicted home values were natural variables to include in 
both a mortgage default and a collateral recovery model.  In this section we estimate 
future values using a simple ARIMA specification to model the historical structure, and 
then use that model t o forecast future index values and confidence bands.  
18  This 
standard model allows for lags, differencing, an intercept term and a moving average 
component.  The long-term trends in the figures above suggest that multiple -year lags 
may contain useful forecasting information.  Thus, the maximum number of lags, up to 
24 months, is used for the Case-Shiller data. In all cases the data are first-differenced, an 
intercept included, and for most, a three -month moving average is employed, reflecting 
the fact that  housing prices have expected positive trends, and that the Case -Shiller 
methodology uses a three month moving average.
19 
IV.6 Forecast at the End of 2005 
In this section we estimate confidence bounds for nineteen of the twenty Case-Shiller 
indexes with the end of 2005 as the forecasting point.
20  Figure 7 plots the forecasted 
trends, the actual trends, and the confidence bounds at two standard errors above and 
below the trend.  In fifteen out of the nineteen cases the actual index value ended below 
the lower confidence bound, suggesting that the ex ante forecaster would have regarded 
such an event to be highly unlikely.  The ARIMA model forecasted positive future price 
increases in all nineteen of the twenty cities. While some MSAs like Seattle, Washington 
were forecast to grow as much as 40% in price over three years,  many MSA’s were 
relatively flat, and expected total growth over three years was in the range of 3% to 6%. 
More relevant for the mortgage lenders and borrowers at the beginning of 2006 was the 
ex ante probability of a decrease in house prices over a three year horizon.  In some 
markets the forecasting model suggested this was a highly unlikely event.  For seven 
markets the chance of a drop in value at the end of a three year period was estimated at 
less than 5%.  However, for many large markets, including Los Angeles, San Diego, San 
Francisco, New York, Boston and Los Vegas, the models would have suggested that a 
drop in prices in the range of 15% to 25% lay within the realm of possibility.   The 
                                                        
17 c.f. Capozza, Kazarian and Thomson (1997), Downing, Stanton and Wallace (2005) 
among others. 
18 The details of the estimation may be found in the documentation for the R statistical 
language.   Shumway and Stoffer (2006) point out inconsistencies in the use of the R 
ARIMA code for differenced series estimation, and offer a modified code to overcome 
these issues.  This paper used their code available at 
http://www.stat.pitt.edu/stoffer/tsa2/index.html. The prediction uses a Kalman filtering 
method, and does not take into account  parameter uncertainty associated with the time-
series model. 
19 Eight MSAs were estimated with ARIMA(18,1,3), five with ARIMA(12,1,3),  one with 
ARIMA(6,1,3), two with ARIMA(3,1,3) and four with ARIMA(3,1,0). 
20 The time series for Dallas is too short to estimate the ARIMA model.   9 
standard  errors  in  the  ARIMA  model  would  have  warned  of  the  possibility  of  a 
significant drop in several major markets on the order of magnitude of previous housing 
market  crashes.    Thus,  it  is  difficult  to  argue  that  the  models  as  such  provided 
unreasonable predictions of risk and return, given historical experience.  Ex post, one 
could argue that the assumption of normality in the ARIMA residuals, and the failure to 
account  for  parameter  uncertainty  in  the  model  resulted  in  overly  tight  confidence 
bands.
21  How current were robust estimation methods among market participants at the 
time?  It is difficult to know.  Using the model as a general guide to risk evaluation does 
not seem to have been entirely foolhardy, except with the hindsight of the dramatic 
market crash. Would an expert at the end of 2005 have had any reason to doubt the 
validity of the data or the model?  Some evidently did. 
Certainly Case and Shiller (2003) sought to use alternative data collected from surveys of 
homeowners to identify a bubbl e in the housing market before 2006.   They polled 
homeowners about their expectations of future price increase in various cities.  The 
expectations for growth over the next ten years in many cities exceeded 10% per year.  
They interpreted the evidence as suggestive of an economic fallacy, since the longer term 
growth in home prices had been below 10%. While is it not difficult to believe that 
homeowners had an unsophisticated anticipation of future price increases  in the early 
2000’s it is  harder to believe that financial institutions and professional risk managers 
would get swept up in irrational beliefs about  future home prices without  relying on the 
analysis of hard data and reliable statistical models.   The rational calculation of default 
probability and recovery through foreclosure should provide an institutional constraint on 
the consequences of individual naiveté with respect to the risk and return of investing in a 
home. 
IV.7 Model Validity 
A natural test in 2006 of the reliability of housing price forecasts might have been to see 
whether  a  time-series  econometric  model  did  a  reasonable  job  at  bounding  the 
performance of housing  markets  in previous years.   Using  the same  methodology  as 
above,  we  made  five-year  ahead  forecasts  using  data  prior  to  2000.    Good  model 
performance is measured by the frequency of the housing index lying within a four-sigma 
band. Figure 8 shows the results of this test.  Six of the nineteen markets exceeded their 
two-sigma confidence band.  Fourteen of the nineteen indexes exceeded the five-year 
forecast.   The rate of model failure should have given an analyst grounds to doubt the 
reliability of the confidence bands, at the very least. 
A  counter-argument  is  that  we  cannot  presume  that  each  observation  is  independent.   
Thus, even though roughly a third of the markets exceeded their bands this would be 
insufficient to reject the validity of the model for risk assessment.  In fact, as the above 
analysis suggests, housing markets were not independent.  However, for purposes of risk 
assessment, high correlation across markets should be grounds for greater caution, not 
greater comfort.   It simply means that the historical data is insufficient to provide a 
reliable test of model validity.    
                                                        
21 See Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) and Goetzmann and Valaitis (2006) for examples 
of robust modeling of housing trends.   10 
Should we be skeptical of the ARIMA forecasting model in general?  Is it just a poor tool 
for analyzing housing price trends?  To consider that possibility, we step back to 1995.  
At this point, fourteen series’ are available.  A five-year forecast, shown in Figure 9, 
compared  with  the  actual  performance  to  the  year  2000  presents  a  slightly  more 
reasonable picture of model performance.  Three series’ exceeded their confidence bands, 
but only just barely in every case.   One thing to note is that the model consistently under-
estimated the growth of housing markets by extrapolating the past long-term drift that 
incorporated significant historical slumps in several cities.  On balance, there might have 
been  moderate  grounds  for  some  skepticism  about  model  reliability,  but  the  strong 
evidence for inertia in housing price indexes would not have been disputable. 
 
V. Market Effects  
V.1 Past market growth and demand for mortgages 
So far, we have shown that the pre-2006 house price indexes demonstrated a strong, 
multi-year, lagged dependency suggesting that they could be forecast out to multiple year 
horizons. A standard ARIMA forecast indeed predicted future price increases in virtually 
all the major Case-Shiller markets, and suggested negligible probabilities of a crash.  An 
important  caveat  is  that  back-tests  of  the  model  might  have  provided  grounds  for 
skepticism, as well as the evident lack of sufficient time-series data to accurately estimate 
long-horizon dependencies.  In this section we consider the implications of reliance on 
these models. 
Case  and  Shiller  (1993)  argue  that  the  high  level  of  index  predictability  might  lead 
market participants to buy in anticipation of future price increases and to believe that they 
could  sell  before  a  price  downturn  –  classic  asset  bubble  expectations.    Therefore, 
holding constant other factors that affect the home purchase decision, such as income, 
LTV, etc, the greater past price rises are, the more likely potential buyers would like to 
become home owners.  Consider a marginal buyer who has a negative value of owning a 
home – the expected cost caused by delinquency and thus foreclosure is sufficiently high 
to offset the expected benefit of ownership.  A greater anticipated rise in value would 
increase the expected benefit of home ownership and reduce the expected cost.  The cost 
will decrease even though the probability of delinquency may be the same because when 
delinquency happens, the owner has a better chance to sell her house for a profit instead 
of going through a foreclosure.  Additionally, expected home price gains increase the 
leverage a home owner could bear without increasing the expected cost. 
We hypothesize that the increasing participation and increasing mortgage leverage due to 
greater anticipated future price increases had an effect on the demand for mortgages.  
First, the total demand for mortgages, being prime and/or subprime, would increase with 
anticipated future price increases.  In addition to the increased number and volume of 
applications, increased demand  may manifest itself in higher spending on housing as 
captured by higher loan to income ratios, lower loan to value ratios, and higher value to 
income ratios.  Second, we expect the riskiness of the mortgage applicant pool increase 
due to increased participation and allocation to housing.  We test both aspects of the   11 
demand effect using 2006 HMDA loan level data.
22  Subprime loans are identified using 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s subprime lender list
23. 
V.2 Empirical evidence on mortgage demand 
Table 1 reports univariate and multivariate cross-MSA regression results predicting the 
demand for prime mortgages in 2006.  The log of the number of loan applications and the 
log of the dollar volume of loan applications are regressed on past price rises from 1999:4 
to 2005:4 (the log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 
2005:4) and an additional set of variables.  The univariate regressions show a positive 
correlation  between  the  demand  for  prime  mortgages  and  past  price  increases  –  the 
coefficient of past price change is positive and significant at the 1% level.  However, this 
positive relationship might be induced by any one of a number of other variables.  For 
example,  big  cities  with  more  home  buyers  would  simply  have  higher  demand  for 
mortgages, and cities with higher employment rates and higher income would also have 
more demand.  To account for these effects, we include the following control variables in 
the  multivariate  regressions:  the  log  of  the  population  of  the  MSA  from  the  2006 
American Community Survey dataset [ACS], the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 
2006 from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the log of the percentage of the population 
over 65 from ACS, the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree 
from ACS, and the log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS.   
The multivariate regressions in Table 1 also provide strong evidence that past price rises 
increase the demand for prime mortgages.  While the coefficient of past price change is 
smaller in the multivariate regressions than in the univariate regressions, it is still positive 
and  significant  at  the  1%  level.    It  is  worth  noting  that  adding  control  variables 
dramatically increases the R squares – from 0.11 for loans and 0.25 for volume in the 
univariate regressions to 0.93 for both loans and volume in the multivariate regressions.  
Further, the coefficients of the control variables seem sensible.  A MSA with a larger 
population, a lower unemployment rate, and a larger portion of the population below 65 
years old would have higher demand for prime mortgages. 
Table  2  reports  similar  univariate  and  multivariate  regressions  of  the  demand  for 
subprime  mortgages  in  2006  as  measured  by  the  number  and  dollar  amount  of 
applications.    Additional  regressions  control  the  demand  for  prime  mortgages.    The 
regressions provide strong and robust evidence that past price rises increase the demand 
for subprime mortgages.  The coefficient on past price change is significant not only 
when  controlling  for  demographic  factors,  but  when  controlling  for  prime  mortgage 
applications.  The prime mortgage applications should capture any missing factors that 
would influence broad demand for home mortgages in the MSA, including any effects 
due to constraints on growth.  Controlling for prime mortgage applications has another 
                                                        
22 Available from www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdarawdata.htm#by_msa.  Avery, Brevoort, 
and Canner (2007) estimate that 80% of all home lending in the U.S. is covered by the 
2006 HMDA data set.  All data in this paper uses loans marked for home purchase.  We 
also define “approved” loans as those that are ultimately originated to avoid double 
counting loans approved by multiple institutions. 
23 Available from www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html   12 
useful interpretation in the context of the Case and Shiller bubble hypothesis.   If one 
assumes that unreasonable extrapolation  of past price increases is the same for prime and 
subprime borrowers, then the prime loan variable should capture demand-side “irrational 
exuberance.”   The remaining price rise effect is either due to even greater irrationality on 
the part of the subprime borrower or it is due to the greater willingness of the subprime 
lenders to approve applications, i.e. relaxation of constraints on the capital supply side.  
The results suggest that past price changes affect the demand for subprime mortgages 
more strongly than the demand for prime mortgages. 
We next test the second aspect of the demand effect: that the average riskiness of loan 
applications  increases  with  past  price  appreciation.    We  use  the  log  of  loan  size  to 
applicant annual income ratio as a proxy for riskiness of loan applications and a measure 
of mortgage leverage.  It is plausible that, holding constant applicant income and other 
factors, the greater the loan size, the higher the probability of delinquency and default.  
Therefore,  the  loan  to  income  ratio  is  correlated  with  riskiness  of  loan  applications.  
Table 3 reports univariate and multivariate regressions of the average of the log of loan 
size to income ratio on the past price change for both prime and subprime mortgage 
applications.  Table 3 provides strong evidence of a riskier applicant pool in MSAs with 
higher  past  price  appreciation:  the  coefficient  of  past  price  changes  is  positive  and 
significant at the 1% level for both prime and subprime mortgages.  The coefficients on 
the  control  variables  also  appear  to  be  sensible.    For  example,  the  greater  the 
unemployment rate in an MSA, the higher the average riskiness of mortgage applicants in 
the MSA (higher loan to income ratios).  We also confirm that the result is capturing an 
applicant’s desire to borrow more (the spending effect), given her income, and not the 
presence  of  more  expensive  houses.    The  coefficient  of  past  price  changes  is  still 
significant when we control for the log of the ratio of median existing single family home 
price to median household income using data from economy.com. 
We further test the hypothesis that borrowers tend to buy more expensive homes, given 
their loan amount and income, in MSAs with greater past price appreciation.  We run two 
types of regressions.  Table 4 regresses the loan to value ratio on past price changes.  The 
average loan-to-value ratios at the MSA level are provided by LoanPerformance.com.  
We expect to see that the loan to value ratio is decreasing in past price appreciation.  This 
would be evidence that borrowers want to invest more in home equity, which means 
borrowers want to buy more expensive homes given the loan amount.  Results in Table 4 
support  the  hypothesis.    The  coefficient  on  past  price  appreciation  is  negative  and 
significant  for  both  prime  and  subprime  loan  applications.    The  result  is  robust  to  a 
control for the ratio of median existing single family home price to median household 
income, so the relation is not due to higher home prices. 
Table 5 regresses the home value to income ratio on past price changes, and tests the 
hypothesis that borrowers want to buy more expensive homes, given their income.  The 
home value to income ratio for an MSA is constructed by dividing the average loan to 
income ratio for this MSA in Table 3 with the average loan to value ratio for this MSA in 
Table 4.  The positive and significant coefficient of past price changes indicates that 
borrowers want to buy more expensive homes given their income.  The result is robust to 
the control for the ratio of median single family home price to median household income.   13 
In sum, Tables 1 through 5 provide evidence for three aspects of the demand effect.  
First, demand for mortgages is increasing in past price appreciation.  Second, the average 
riskiness of mortgage applications is increasing in past price appreciation.  Third, both 
prime and subprime borrowers want to buy more expensive homes given their income 
and loan amount in MSAs with greater past price increases. 
V.3 Empirical evidence on mortgage supply 
The apparent predictability of future price changes might also affect lenders’ behavior.  
Past price rises could support a lender’s view that the collateral value upon which the cost 
of future borrower default depends will be worth as much or more than the original loan 
value as long as the positive serial correlation in lagged returns is reliable.  As a result, 
holding constant other factors, lenders may be more willing to make loans (more relaxed 
underwriting standards) in MSAs with high past price appreciation.  The increased supply 
of mortgages should then appear in higher approval and origination rates. 
Table  6  tests  if  past  price  appreciation  increases  prime  loan  approvals,  which  are 
measured by the number of loans approved and the total dollar loan amount.  In Table 6, 
when we do not control for loan applications, more loans are approved in MSAs with 
greater past price increases.  However, when we control for loan applications, past price 
increases has a negative coefficient.  This indicates that the prime lenders approve a 
smaller portion of applications in MSAs with greater past price appreciation.  Relating 
this result with our earlier finding that the riskiness of applications is increasing in greater 
past price changes, we have no evidence to support the hypothesis that prime lenders 
accommodated increased demand in high-growth MSAs. 
Table 7 conducts the same analysis on subprime loans.  The coefficient on past price 
increases  is  positive  and  significant  when  we  do  not  control  for  applications,  but  is 
insignificant (positive and significant in one specification) once we control for demand as 
measured  by  the  volume  of  applications.    This  result  provides  weak  evidence  that 
subprime lenders accommodated increased demand.  Despite the higher leverage and thus 
greater riskiness of loan applications in MSAs with greater past price appreciation (which 
we  established  in  Table  4),  subprime  lenders  approve  roughly  the  same  portion  of 
applications. 
Table  8  formally  tests  the  differences  between  prime  and  subprime  approvals.    The 
dependent variable is the approvals for subprime loans minus the approvals of prime 
loans.    The  regressions  control  for  the  difference  between  subprime  and  prime 
applications.  Table 8 shows that the coefficient on past price increases is positive and 
significant in all specifications.  This result shows that subprime lenders approve a larger 
portion of applications than prime lenders in high-growth MSAs. 
We further consider whether the leverage of approved loans relates to past price changes 
for  both  prime  and  subprime  loans.    Table  9  regresses  the  loan  to  income  ratios  of 
approved loans on past price changes, with and without controlling for the loan to income 
ratios of applications.  For prime loans, when we do not control for the loan to income 
ratio  of  applications,  past  price  changes  have  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient.  
However, once we control for the loan to income ratio of applications, past price changes   14 
have  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient.    This  result  suggests  that  prime  lenders 
approve applications with lower loan to income ratios in MSAs with greater past price 
changes.    This  is  consistent  with  the  notion  that  prime  lenders  did  not  use  looser 
underwriting standards in such MSAs.  However, in the same regressions for subprime 
approvals, the  coefficient  on  past price increases  is positive  and significant with and 
without controlling for the loan to income ratio of applications.  This result shows that 
subprime lenders approved application with higher leverage in MSAs with greater past 
price  changes,  which  is  consistent  with  the  notion  that  subprime  lenders  used  looser 
underwriting standards in high-growth MSAs. 
Table  10  tests  whether  past  price  changes  are  related  to  the    loan  to  value  ratio  of 
approved  prime  and  subprime  mortgages.    The  coefficient  on  past  price  increases  is 
negative  and  significant  for  both  prime  and  subprime  approvals,  with  and  without 
controlling for the loan to value ratios of applications.  Because loans with lower loan to 
value ratios are less risky holding constant other factors, Table 10 provides no evidence 
of  looser  underwriting  standards  among  both  prime  and  subprime  lenders.    Though 
applicants in MSAs with greater home price appreciation wanted to buy more expensive 
houses for a given loan amount, lenders did not accommodate this spending demand. 
Table 11 tests whether the ratio of home value to borrower income of approved prime 
and subprime mortgages is related to past price changes, with and without controlling for 
the  ratio  of  value  to  income  in  applications.    The  results  are  consistent.    For  both 
approved prime and subprime loans, the value to income ratio is increasing in greater past 
price changes.  This indicates that for a given income, both prime and subprime lenders 
allowed  borrowers  to  buy  more  expensive  homes  in  MSAs  with  great  past  price 
increases. 
V.3 Loan level evidence on mortgage supply 
We  also  test  the  supply  effect  at  the  loan  level  using  probit  analysis  on  the 
approval/rejection of loan applications.  The analysis uses all mortgage applications for 
purchasing owner-occupied single family houses secured by first liens.  Separate probit 
analysis is conducted for prime and subprime applications.  Dependant variables are 1 if 
an application is approved and 0 if not.  Explanatory variables are past price rises in the 
MSA of the application, the log percentage of the minority population in the census tract 
of the loan application, HUD median family income in dollars (log) in the MSA of the 
loan application, the log of the percentage of tract median family income compared to 
MSA/MD median family income, the log of the size of the application to the income of 
the  applicant,  and  a  dummy  that  equals  1  if  preapproval  was  requested.    additional  
explanatory variables control for the riskiness of applications.  Note that the data do not 
allow us to control for the loan to value ratio at the loan level. 
Table 12 reports the probit analysis for prime and subprime mortgage applications.  Past 
price rises have opposite effects on the approval of prime and subprime applications.  
Greater price rises reduce the approval probability for prime applications and increase the 
approval  probability  of  subprime  applications.    This  indicates  significant  distinctions 
between  prime  and  subprime  lenders.    In  the  context  of  our  earlier  results  that  loan 
applications tend to be more risky in MSAs with greater past price increases, the results   15 
in  Table  12  do  not  provide  evidence  for  looser  underwriting  standards  among  prime 
lenders  but  do  provide  evidence  of  looser  underwriting  standards  among  subprime 
lenders. 
Coefficients on the other explanatory variables in the probit analysis are sensible.  A 
lower percentage of minority population, a higher median income, a larger ratio of tract 
to MSA median income, and a lower loan to income ratio increase the probability for an 
application  to  be  approved.    The  results  seem  to  suggest  that  the  control  variables 
effectively help proxy for riskiness of applications. 
To visualize the effects of past price rises on subprime approvals, Figure 10 plots the 
relationship between the growth of the OHHEO indexes over the period 2000 to 2005 
against  the  log  dollar  amount  of  subprime  loans  originated  in  2006  for  new  home 
purchases (in thousands).  The positive relationship in  Figure 10 between past price 
growth and dollar of subprime issuance is clearly evident.
24 
While there is evidence in the behavioral finance literature that lower-income people are 
less  financially  sophisticated
25,  our  empirical  analysis  indicates  that  past  price 
appreciation  affects not only the demand for subprime mortgages but subprime mortgage 
lenders,  though the evidence  suggests that lenders may have merely accommodated 
increased demand because of increased capital.  Mian and Sufi (2008) in fact show that 
capital supply constraints were meaningful in the period, although they  also document a 
trend towards looser standards.  Thus our results provide strong evidence that the binding 
but loosening supply constraint based upon forecasts using house price indexes as inputs 
helped contribute to more subprime applications and also possibly approvals in “hot” 
cities as opposed to only overly-optimistic buyer demand.  The increased capital story 
does  not  explain  why  subprime  mortgage  approvals  were  more  sensitive  to  higher 
demand in MSAs with higher past price appreciation than prime approvals.   
 
VI Alternative explanations 
VI.1 Moral Hazard 
Consider the Keys et. al. (2008) explanation for the volume of subprime issuance: that 
loan originators did not care about the quality of the loans because there was a ready 
market  to  securitize  them.  Our  empirical  results  do  not  rule  out  this  moral-hazard 
explanation,  but  we  find  evidence  that  may  require  further  elaboration  of  the  moral 
hazard model. If subprime lenders simply made every loan they could, regardless of the 
probability of default or the expected recovery upon default, we would not expect to see 
approval probability of subprime application correlated with past price increases at the 
loan level.  Our empirical evidence substantiates the effects of past house price changes 
                                                        
24 Susan Wachter also documents this correlation for housing and mortgage data in 2002  
in her presentation to the Evolving Housing Finance Marketplace Roundtable, January 
16, 2008. 
25 For example Dhar and Zhu (2006)   16 
on both mortgage applications and approvals, which suggests that extrapolations of past 
price  increases  in  these  markets  seem  to  be  consistent  with  the  rationality  of  both 
borrowers and lenders – if one can call trust in price extrapolation rational.  Work needs 
to be done to distinguish between reliance on a model and lender moral hazard. 
VI.2 Reverse causality 
Mian and Sufi (2008) hypothesize that the price growth from 2000 to 2005 was caused by 
increasing access to credit, which in turn pushed up housing prices.  As with the moral 
hazard story, we do not rule this hypothesis out.  In fact, a classic bubble would include 
prices increasing on expectations of future price rises and vice-versa.   Our examination 
of the 1995 to 2000 price indexes suggests, however, that some housing markets were 
rising  before  the  widespread  access  to  credit  by  subprime  borrowers.    An  important 
implication of the credit-driving-prices story in the context of the current paper is that it 
raises  the  question  of  reverse-causality  in  the  cross-sectional  regressions  –  that  the 
relationship we document is an artifact of  past lax credit access (where past credit access 
is proxied by 2006 subprime issuance)  having driven up prices. 
In some sense, subprime credit issuance in 2006 was forward-looking, regardless.  When 
forecasting future growth and risk of loss, a lender might be wise to factor in how much 
of that forecast is predicated on continuing past credit policies, since a sudden change in 
market  conditions  –  like  a  credit  crunch,  or  a  drop  in  demand  for  mortgage-backed 
securities would represent a regime-change that should alter parameters in a  forecasting 
model.  However, if lenders expected the conditions that led to past price increases in 
certain markets to continue (including lax credit standards) then extrapolation of past 
trends would remain a relevant input to lending risk analysis. 
 
VII. Discussion 
VII.1 Interpretation of Basic Results 
This  paper  document  results  regarding  the  effects  of  past  house  price  changes  on 
applications and approvals of both prime and subprime mortgages.  First, econometric 
models applied to housing index data up to 2006 predicted future price increases and low 
probabilities  of  an  extreme  crash  in  home  values.    Second,  past  price  appreciation 
increased mortgage applications, the leverage of borrowers, and the prices of purchased 
homes (with borrower income and loan amount held constant).  Third, past price changes 
evidently affected the approvals of prime and subprime applications differently.  We have 
no evidence that prime lenders used looser underwriting standards, but we do have some 
evidence for subprime lenders.  Overall, our analysis provides evidence of extrapolation 
of past price gains by subprime borrowers and likely lenders. 
We also considered alternative explanations for theories about the subprime crisis, and 
the observed correlations documented in the cross-sectional regressions, including moral 
hazard and reverse causality. Moral hazard as the cause of the subprime crisis would 
require an additional explanation regarding why the approval probability of subprime 
applications at the loan level is correlated to past house price increases.  The reverse   17 
causality argument is one possible additional explanation. If both were true, it would 
suggest a deeply dysfunctional, perhaps even cynical capital market.  We cannot rule this 
possibility out, but the hypothesis we propose is at least consistent with lenders having 
the intention of quantifying and managing risk. 
VII.2 Implications for Risk Management 
The evidence in this paper also raises the broader issue of the role of statistical analysis of 
historical data for the purposes of risk management.   The difference between uncertainty 
and risk is the potential for expressing the range of future outcomes quantitatively.  The 
development of good housing indexes made econometric forecasting  possible, but it also 
created the potential for risk models to fail.  It is thus a strange twist that the technology 
for quantifying risk led to a reliance on models that are, themselves, liable to failure. 
The larger irony of the subprime crisis is that it struck the financial markets at a time that 
might otherwise have been considered a revolution in risk management.  In institutional 
portfolio management, the world had finally rejected security specific risk measures – 
“safe”  securities  lists  –  in  favor  of  prudent  portfolio  diversification.
26   Even  as 
institutional managers extended their portfolios beyond stocks and bonds into the world 
of hedge funds, they tracked such things as their exposure to numerous risk factors: 
interest rate shocks, market moves, emerging market events, shifts in inflation, the va lue 
premium, the size factor and many more.  Indeed the complaint heard most in the early 
part of the decade was not about the lack of risk measures, but rather that risk assessment 
had come to dominate return generation in portfolio decision-making. 
In banking, Basel II had been considered a major new paradigm for the institutional 
evaluation of risk.   It validated a “value-at-risk” approach for determining bank capital 
requirements,  encouraging  institutions  to  build  models  relying  upon  the  statistical 
analysis of historical data.   
In the domain of housing and mortgages, one would have been inclined to trust in the 
nearly two decades of experience by investment banks with mortgage-backed securities 
issuance, and to take comfort in the existence of well-capitalized arbitrageurs and hedge 
funds  who  marginally  profited  by  driving  away  pricing  inefficiencies  through  the 
application of high-tech statistical models.   
Perhaps most importantly, an entire government agency, the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight [OFHEO] existed for evaluating the capital adequacy of the large 
quasi-governmental  mortgage  insurance  companies;  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac.  
OFHEO  carefully  collected  housing  and  mortgage  data  from  these  agencies  and 
constructed indexes of home price appreciation, using well-tested, academically validated 
                                                        
26 An important exception to this is the triple A standard for money market funds and the 
investment grade standard for regulated institutional portfolios such as banks and 
insurance companies.   18 
econometric methodologies, in order to continuously assess the relationship between the 
value of the underlying collateral – the housing stock – and the agencies’ liabilities. 
27   
In all of these sectors, the explosion of data, increasingly sophisticated and well-tested 
models and the widespread employment of well-trained professional analysts, and the 
genuine commitment of regulatory entities in banking and mortgage insurance provided 
reasonable grounds for comfort that any potential  future crisis  in the financial markets 
and institutions would be detectable and quantifiable. 
The  further  irony  is  that  the  innovations  in  securitization  in  the  early  2000’s  were 
likewise deemed revolutionary.  Although the instruments were complex, the concept 
was simple. Institutions became risk packagers who creatively parsed risks and sold them 
to  the  entities  most  suited  to  hold  them.      For  example,  if  the  residual  tranche  of  a 
collateralized mortgage obligation was inappropriate for a fixed income mutual fund, it 
might be perfect for a speculative hedge fund seeking high return and willing to take high 
risks.  The safer tranches that remained might better match the risk appetite of the mutual 
fund.  Market observers generally believed that securitization, which had created a liquid, 
global,  efficient  market  for  risk,  rendered  our  financial  system  robust  to  any  single 
negative shock.
28   After all, if mortgages in a single city went bad, this loss would be 
diffused broadly among the world’s investors rather than being concentrated in a single, 
possibly fragile institution.  And still better, those harmed would be those who were best 
prepared for the loss.     
Parallel  to  the  innovations  in  the  asset-backed  securitization  market  were  remarkable 
strides in tools for mitigating corporate default risk. Credit default swaps were a new 
form of financial contract in the early 2000s and they became a major mechanism for 
measuring  and  allocating  the  risk  of  corporate  bond  defaults.  This  revolution  in  the 
monetization  of  risk  extended  equally  to  the  commodities  markets  –  particularly  to 
energy futures – where over-the-counter trading, while not new, grew dramatically. 
Market participants and observers in the early part of the decade were not naïve enough 
to believe that the twin revolutions in risk management and securitization had eliminated 
risk, or even reduced it much.   They did mostly believe that the new quantification and 
commodification of risk allowed for a more efficient allocation of it, and a new, more 
precise awareness of its consequences.  Again, these beliefs seem in retrospect to have 
been pitifully optimistic.  The point germane to the evidence in this paper is that the 
foundation of these beliefs rested, in part, on quantification and modeling – the collection 
and analysis of data -- and forecasting of  the range of future trends. 
One general lesson for future risk management to take from the analysis in this paper is 
that unconditional forecasts made on conditional data can go very wrong.   In the case of 
the subprime crisis, data were generated under institutional conditions such as a liquid 
markets for securitized mortgage debt and for housing.   Failure of these conditions after 
2006 represented an important (and difficult to model) regime-switch. 
                                                        
27 Cf. Calhoun (1996) 
28 Some readers will not count themselves among these market observers.  There were 
certainly contrarian views.     19   20 
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Table 1. Demand for prime mortgages and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the determinants of the demand for prime mortgages 
in 2006.  The demand is measured with the number of mortgage applications (in log) and the volume of applications (in log of $ 
thousands).  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price 
index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 2006 American 
Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high school% 
(log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, and [income per capita (log)] the log of 
income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Loans (in log)  Volume (in log) 








Population (log)    ***1.078 
(0.021) 
  ***1.071 
(0.024) 
Unemployment% (log)    ***-0.240 
(0.060) 
  ***-0.233 
(0.072) 
65 and above% (log)    ***-0.318 
(0.093) 
  ***-0.651 
(0.108) 
High school% (log)    0.199 
(0.316) 
  -0.261 
(0.392) 
Income per capita (log)    0.103 
(0.175) 
  ***1.023 
(0.210) 
Sample size  376  344  376  344 
Adjusted R2  0.11  0.93  0.25  0.93 
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Table 2. Demand for subprime mortgages and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the determinants of the demand for subprime 
mortgages in 2006.  The demand is measured with the number of mortgage applications (in log) and the volume of applications 
(in log of $ thousands).  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO 
house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 2006 
American Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high 
school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the 
log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS, and [Prime applications (log)] the number (for loan regressions) or volume 
(for volume regression) of prime mortgage applications.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level.  
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Loans (in log)  Volume (in log) 




















































Prime applications (log)      ***1.005 
(0.081) 
    ***0.996 
(0.073) 
Sample size  376  344  344  376  344  344 
Adjusted R2  0.16  0.88  0.93  0.28  0.89  0.94 
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Table 3. Application loan to income ratios and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the loan to income ratio of the prime and subprime 
mortgage applications in 2006.  The dependant variable is the MSA average ratio (in log) of loan size to applicant gross annual 
income.  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price index 
in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 2006 American Community 
Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high school% (log)] the log of the 
percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the log of income per capita (in $ 
thousands) from ACS, and [Price income ratio (log)] the log of the ratio of median existing single family home price to median 
household income from economy.com.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Mortgage types 
  Prime  Subprime 












Population (log)      **-0.015 
(0.008) 
    0.003 
(0.007) 
Unemployment% (log)      ***0.067 
(0.022) 
    ***0.065 
(0.023) 
65 and above% (log)      ***-0.091 
(0.030) 
    0.029 
(0.027) 
High school% (log)      **0.282 
(0.135) 
    -0.167 
(0.131) 
Income per capita (log)      **0.153 
(0.064) 
    ***0.180 
(0.059) 








Sample size  376  368  336  376  368  336 
Adjusted R2  0.32  0.32  0.37  0.17  0.18  0.18 
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Table 4. Application loan to value ratio and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the loan to value ratio of the prime and subprime 
mortgage applications in 2006.  The dependant variable is the MSA average ratio (in log) of loan size to home value of 
mortgage applications, which is inferred from two ratios: the average loan to value ratio of mortgage approvals from Loan 
Performance and the ratio of the average size of mortgage applications to the average size of mortgage approvals from HMDA. 
Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 
to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 2006 American Community Survey 
dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
[65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high school% (log)] the log of the 
percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the log of income per capita (in $ 
thousands) from ACS, and [Price income ratio (log)] the log of the ratio of median existing single family home price to median 
household income from economy.com.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Mortgage types 
  Prime  Subprime 












Population (log)      -0.002 
(0.003) 
    0.003 
(0.005) 
Unemployment% (log)      0.003 
(0.007) 
    **0.025 
(0.012) 
65 and above% (log)      -0.013 
(0.011) 
    **0.059 
(0.023) 
High school% (log)      **0.103 
(0.052) 
    0.072 
(0.069) 
Income per capita (log)      ***-0.125 
(0.024) 
    0.030 
(0.031) 








Sample size  347  339  336  347  339  336 
Adjusted R2  0.28  0.30  0.41  0.25  0.26  0.29   15 
Table 5. Application home value to income ratio and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the home value to income ratio of the prime and 
subprime mortgage applications in 2006.  The dependant variable is the MSA average ratio (in log) of home value to applicant 
gross annual income, which is inferred from two ratios: the average loan to value ratio (in table 4) and the average loan to 
income ratio of mortgage applications.  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of 
the OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 
2006 American Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high 
school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the 
log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS, and [Price income ratio (log)] the log of the ratio of median existing single 
family home price to median household income from economy.com.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Mortgage types 
  Prime  Subprime 












Population (log)      -0.013 
(0.008) 
    0.000 
(0.009) 
Unemployment% (log)      ***0.064 
(0.023) 
    0.039 
(0.025) 
65 and above% (log)      **-0.078 
(0.031) 
    -0.030 
(0.037) 
High school% (log)      0.179 
(0.153) 
    *-0.239 
(0.144) 
Income per capita (log)      ***0.278 
(0.073) 
    **0.150 
(0.068) 








Sample size  347  339  336  347  339  336 
Adjusted R2  0.39  0.39  0.48  0.32  0.32  0.33   16 
  
Table 6. Approvals of prime mortgages and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the determinants of the approvals of prime mortgages 
in 2006.  The approvals are measured with the number of mortgage approved (in log) and the volume of mortgage approved 
(in log of $ thousands).  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO 
house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 2006 
American Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high 
school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the 
log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS, and [Prime applications (log)] the log of prime mortgage applications.  
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Loans (in log)  Volume (in log) 
















Population (log)    ***1.052 
(0.019) 
  ***0.076 
(0.014) 
  ***1.047 
(0.022) 
  ***0.070 
(0.011) 
Unemployment% (log)    ***-0.260 
(0.086) 
  ***-0.041 
(0.013) 
  ***-0.245 
(0.068) 
  **-0.033 
(0.013) 
65 and above% (log)    ***-0.260 
(0.086) 
  *0.027 
(0.016) 
  ***-0.585 
(0.099) 
  0.009 
(0.017) 
High school% (log)    *0.497 
(0.297) 
  ***0.317 
(0.073) 
  0.053 
(0.370) 
  ***0.291 
(0.077) 
Income per capita (log)    0.176 
(0.164) 
  ***0.083 
(0.031) 
  ***1.092 
(0.194) 
  ***0.159 
(0.033) 








Sample size  376  344  376  344  376  344  376  344 
Adjusted R2  0.10  0.93  0.99  0.99  0.14  0.93  0.99  0.99 
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Table 7. Approvals of subprime mortgages and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the determinants of the approvals of subprime 
mortgages in 2006.  The approvals are measured with the number of mortgage approved (in log) and the volume of mortgage 
approved (in log of $ thousands).  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of the 
OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 
2006 American Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high 
school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the 
log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS, and [Subprime applications (log)] the log of subprime mortgage 
applications.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Loans (in log)  Volume (in log) 
















Population (log)    ***1.334 
(0.034) 
  **-0.044 
(0.022) 
  ***1.329 
(0.036) 
  -0.029 
(0.018) 
Unemployment% (log)    0.129 
(0.094) 
  ***-0.080 
(0.019) 
  0.119 
(0.105) 
  ***-0.089 
(0.019) 
65 and above% (log)    -0.019 
(0.158) 
  -0.004 
(0.029) 
  **-0.341 
(0.167) 
  0.002 
(0.033) 
High school% (log)    ***-1.918 
(0.570) 
  -0.191 
(0.128) 
  ***-2.454 
(0.617) 
  *-0.245 
(0.132) 
Income per capita (log)    -0.245 
(0.271) 
  -0.043 
(0.057) 
  0.412 
(0.310) 












Sample size  376  344  376  344  376  344  376  344 
Adjusted R2  0.16  0.87  0.99  0.99  0.28  0.88  0.99  0.99 
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Table 8. Differences in approvals of prime and subprime mortgages 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions concerning the differences between the effect of past price 
changes on prime mortgage approvals and the effect on subprime mortgage approvals in 2006.  The dependant variable is the 
approvals for subprime mortgages minus the approvals for prime mortgages in the same MSA.  The approvals are measured 
with the number of mortgage approved (in log) and the volume of mortgage approved (in log of $ thousands).  Explanatory 
variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 to the index 
in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 2006 American Community Survey dataset [ACS], 
[unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% 
(log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the 
population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from 
ACS, [Difference in applications] the log of subprime mortgage application minus the log of prime mortgage applications.  
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Loans (in log)  Volume (in log) 
















Population (log)    ***0.283 
(0.027) 
  **0.021 
(0.009) 
  ***0.282 
(0.027) 
  **0.021 
(0.010) 
Unemployment% (log)    ***0.387 
(0.086) 
  ***-0.087 
(0.022) 
  ***0.364 
(0.088) 
  ***-0.100 
(0.024) 
65 and above% (log)    **0.241 
(0.108) 
  **-0.085 
(0.036) 
  **0.244 
(0.110) 
  **-0.094 
(0.043) 
High school% (log)    ***-2.414 
(0.505) 
  ***-0.417 
(0.151) 
  ***-2.507 
(0.486) 
  ***-0.488 
(0.152) 
Income per capita (log)    *-0.421 
(0.222) 
  -0.101 
(0.064) 
  ***-0.681 
(0.220) 












Sample size  376  344  376  344  376  344  376  344 
Adjusted R2  0.16  0.51  0.95  0.95  0.15  0.51  0.95  0.95 
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Table 9. Approval Loan to income ratio and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions regarding the average loan to income ratio (in log) of prime and 
subprime mortgage approvals in 2006.  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price change (log)] the log of the ratio of 
the OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of the population of the MSA from the 
2006 American Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population over 65 from ACS, [high 
school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from ACS, [income per capita (log)] the 
log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS, and [Application LTI (log)] the average loan to income ratio of mortgage 
applications.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Prime approvals  Subprime approvals 
















Population (log)    **-0.016 
(0.007) 
  -0.001 
(0.001) 
  0.002 
(0.007) 
  -0.001 
(0.003) 
Unemployment% (log)    ***0.067 
(0.022) 
  -0.002 
(0.003) 
  ***0.068 
(0.023) 
  0.004 
(0.007) 
65 and above% (log)    ***-0.105 
(0.030) 
  ***-0.010 
(0.003) 
  0.016 
(0.026) 
  -0.013 
(0.012) 
High school% (log)    **0.329 
(0.131) 
  ***0.049 
(0.015) 
  -0.174 
(0.128) 
  -0.011 
(0.040) 
Income per capita (log)    **0.154 
(0.063) 
  -0.006 
(0.005) 
  ***0.173 
(0.059) 
  -0.004 
(0.016) 








Sample size  376  344  376  344  376  344  376  344 
Adjusted R2  0.30  0.37  0.99  0.99  0.24  0.23  0.91  0.90   20 
Table 10. Origination loan to value ratio and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions concerning the effect of past price changes on prime and 
subprime mortgage origination Loan to Value Ratio (LTV) in log in 2006.  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price 
change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of 
the population of the MSA from the 2006 American Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the 
MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the 
population over 65 from ACS, [high school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from 
ACS, [income per capita (log)] the log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS, [Difference in applications] the log of 
subprime mortgage application minus the log of prime mortgage applications, and [Application LTV (log)] the average LTV of 
mortgage applications.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Prima approvals  Subprime approvals 
















Population (log)    0.000 
(0.002) 
  0.001 
(0.001) 
  0.000 
(0.002) 
  -0.000 
(0.002) 
Unemployment% (log)    0.004 
(0.006) 
  0.004 
(0.004) 
  ***0.017 
(0.006) 
  **0.012 
(0.005) 
65 and above% (log)    0.002 
(0.010) 
  *0.010 
(0.006) 
  ***0.052 
(0.008) 
  ***0.041 
(0.007) 
High school% (log)    0.058 
(0.038) 
  -0.006 
(0.024) 
  0.055 
(0.037) 
  0.041 
(0.035) 
Income per capita (log)    ***-0.125 
(0.020) 
  ***-0.045 
(0.011) 
  -0.010 
(0.020) 
  -0.016 
(0.017) 








Sample size  349  344  347  344  349  344  347  344 
Adjusted R2  0.50  0.63  0.84  0.86  0.49  0.57  0.59  0.63   21 
Table 11. Origination home value to income ratio and past price changes 
This table reports cross-sectional MSA level linear regressions concerning the effect of past price changes on prime and 
subprime mortgage origination home value to income ratio (VTI) in 2006.  Explanatory variables for each MSA are: [past price 
change (log)] the log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price index in 1999:4 to the index in 2005:4, [population (log)] the log of 
the population of the MSA from the 2006 American Community Survey dataset [ACS], [unemployment% (log)] the log of the 
MSA unemployment rate in 2006 from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), [65 and above% (log)] the log of the percentage of the 
population over 65 from ACS, [high school% (log)] the log of the percentage of the population with a high school degree from 
ACS, [income per capita (log)] the log of income per capita (in $ thousands) from ACS, [Difference in applications] the log of 
subprime mortgage application minus the log of prime mortgage applications, and [Application VTI (log)] the average VTI of 
mortgage applications.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Explanatory variables  Dependant variables 
  Prime approvals  Subprime approvals 
















Population (log)    **-0.017 
(0.008) 
  ***-0.004 
(0.001) 
  0.001 
(0.007) 
  0.002 
(0.003) 
Unemployment% (log)    ***0.063 
(0.023) 
  -0.001 
(0.005) 
  **0.052 
(0.023) 
  **0.020 
(0.010) 
65 and above% (log)    ***-0.107 
(0.031) 
  ***-0.029 
(0.006) 
  -0.036 
(0.029) 
  -0.014 
(0.013) 
High school% (log)    0.270 
(0.138) 
  ***0.105 
(0.033) 
  *-0.229 
(0.133) 
  -0.037 
(0.058) 
Income per capita (log)    ***0.280 
(0.069) 
  0.005 
(0.013) 
  ***0.184 
(0.067) 
  **0.062 
(0.029) 








Sample size  347  344  347  344  347  344  347  344 
Adjusted R2  0.42  0.53  0.97  0.98  0.39  0.42  0.87  0.87 
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Table 12. Probit analysis of loan approvals 
This table reports the probit analysis for the approval of prime and subprime mortgage applications respectively.  The analysis 
uses all applications for conventional mortgages for purchasing owner occupied single family houses from each MSA.  
Dependant variables are 1 if an application is approved and 0 if not.  Explanatory variables are: [past price change (log)] the 
log of the ratio of the OFEHO house price index in 2005:4 to the index in 1999:4, [population minority% (log)] the log of the 
percentage of the minority population in the census tract of the loan application, [median income (log)] HUD median family 
income in dollars (log) in the MSA of the loan application, [tract to MSA median income percentage (log)] the log of the 
percentage of tract median family income compared to MSA/MD median family income, [loan size to income ratio (log)] the log 
of the size of the application to the income of the applicant, [preapproval dummy] a dummy that equals 1 if preapproval was 
requested, [applicants per capita (log)] the log of the number of applicants in an MSA divided by the total population in the 
MSA, and [VTL] the log of the requested loan size to the average MSA home value or originated loans.  Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 1% level. 
Explanatory Variables  Prime Approvals  Subprime Approvals 






























































Applicants per capita (log) 
  ***-0.027 
(0.001) 
    ***-0.007 
(0.001) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
6,449,088  6,449,088    1,412,857  1,412,857   
 